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Citizens, Bribery and the Propensity to Protest 
 
 
 
Abstract 
It is widely assumed that the more one experiences corruption the more likely one is to want to 
protest about it. Yet empirical evidence illustrating this is thin on the ground. This paper fills that 
gap by focusing on the extent to which self-reported experience of bribery affects the willingness 
to engage in protests against corruption in Africa. We find that the more one experiences bribery 
the more one is likely to support anti-corruption protests. A further unexpected finding is that 
personal experience of corruption also increases the willingness to rely on bribes to solve public 
administration problems. In fact, an increase in the frequency of paying bribes has a stronger 
effect on the likelihood to use bribery to solve problems with public officials than preferring to 
join protests and demonstrations. 
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1. Introduction 
Increasing experiences of corruption are widely assumed to be a key rallying point for ordinary 
citizens around the world to engage in anti-corruption protests (see Bayerle 2014, African 
Development Bank 2014, Chayes 2018). Pierre Landell-Mills (2013), for example, identifies 
bribery as one of the triggers of civic engagement. “People” he notes “are increasingly intolerant 
of being squeezed for bribes and more incensed at officials growing fat on extortions and 
crooked deals” (Landell-Mills 2013: iv).  
 
Yet apart from analysis of a small number of South American cases (see Faughnan & Seligson 
2015, McCann and Domínguez 1998, Gingerich 2009) and former communist countries 
(Kostadinova 2009), the nature of the relationship between exposure to bribery and protest has 
attracted little academic attention. Scholars interested in Africa often examine individual-level 
predictors of bribery experiences (see Justesen & Bjornskov 2014; Peiffer & Rose 2016; Mbate 
2017) and not the impact of bribery experience on political action. Other Africanists focus on 
the impact of perceptions of corruption on the propensity to participate in protests more 
generally (Inman & Andrew 2008). It is, therefore, unclear first, why some ordinary Africans 
protest against corruption specifically while others do not, and second, what role direct exposure 
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to bribery plays in the decision to participate in anti-corruption protests. This paper fills these 
gaps by focusing on the extent to which self-reported experience of bribery affects the 
willingness to engage in protests against corruption in the African context. Specifically, we test 
the idea that the experience of paying bribes acts as a mobilising grievance, and that an increase 
in the frequency of paying bribes will lead to an increase in the willingness to use protests as a 
means to tackle corruption. 	 
 
We choose Africa both as it is a continent that has been ravaged by the corrupt practices of 
many of its politicians and also as there have been an array of ever more prominent anti-
corruption protests across many of its countries. Corruption matters everywhere, but nowhere 
more than it does in Africa. The analysis draws upon the third and sixth rounds of the 
Afrobarometer surveys. The third round was conducted in 2005/06 in 18 countries while the 
sixth round was conducted between 2014 and 2016 in 36 countries.  
 
Protest participants seldom single out ‘corruption’ as the reason for their decision to engage in 
political action. In her analysis of popular resistance against corruption in 12 countries, for 
instance, Beyerle (2014:247) notes that “most of the civic initiatives targeting corruption were 
linked to other injustices and struggles”. This, as Bauhr (2016:6) poignantly observes, makes it 
difficult to know exactly what spurs anti-corruption movements, more especially since 
corruption is often “used as a ‘catch-all’ concept, including both economic grievances and 
democratic deficits”. The Afrobarometer data used in this paper enable us to circumvent this 
challenge of isolating the effect of the experience of corruption on propensity to use protests as 
one way to challenge corruption. The data do these by providing information on the attitudes of 
ordinary Africans towards the use of protests to challenge corruption and on personal 
experiences of bribery. The data also allow us to examine how an increase in experience of 
corruption affects the propensity to have taken part in actual protests in the year prior to the 
survey.  
 
The paper is structured as follows. The next section offers a brief overview of the theoretical 
framework linking the experience of bribery and the propensity to protest. This is followed by a 
brief discussion of the data and empirical strategies employed. The third section outlines the 
results while the final section discusses these and concludes. To anticipate the main findings, an 
increase in bribery experience does increase the support for the use of protests to tackle 
corruption. Second, and most importantly, an increase in experience of bribery increases the 
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probability of having taken part in protests and demonstrations in the year prior to the survey.  A 
further unexpected finding is that personal experience of corruption also increases the 
willingness to rely on bribes to solve public administration problems. In fact, an increase in the 
frequency of paying bribes has a stronger effect on likelihood to use bribery to solve problems 
with public officials than preferring to join protests and demonstrations.  
 
2. A grievances explanation of collective action 
Grievance explanations of protests draw from the seminal work of Ted Robert Gurr (1970). The 
grievance model posits that personal discontent underpins individual willingness to bear the 
costs of collective civic action (Gurr 2015). Indeed, as Snow and Soule (2010:23) argue, “none of 
the various sets of conditions necessary for the emergence and operation of social movements is 
more important that the generation of deeply felt [and] shared grievances”. The grievance model 
(or some of its versions) has been used to explain collective civic engagement in many parts of 
the African continent (see Mottiar & Bond 2012, Resnick 2015). A major flaw in the grievance 
analysis is that in most cases the rate of collective civic engagement does not correspond with the 
ever-present nature of discontent (Tarrow 1998, Tilly 2003). As Tarrow observes, “even a 
cursory look at modern history shows that outbreaks of contention cannot be derived from the 
deprivation people suffer or the disorganization in their societies. For these preconditions are far 
more enduring than the movements they support” (Tarrow 1998: 71). Results of a multilevel 
regression analysis of self-reported rates of protest across the globe are consistent with Tarrow’s 
argument as they indicate that “many people who hold equal grievances do not protest” (Dalton, 
van Sickle & Weldon 2010:17). Lichbach (1996) explains that even if aggrieved individuals 
wanted to engage in collective action, the spectre of free-riding would prove to be a major 
hindrance.  
 
One of the points that proponents of the grievance model stress, mostly in response to rebuttals 
rooted in collective action theory, is that grievances are not created equally (see Snow 1998). 
Some grievances have a stronger mobilising potential than others.  Bergstrand (2014) argues that 
grievances that are more direct and personal or that lead to significant personal losses have a 
particularly strong mobilisation effect.  Research on the individual-level effects of corruption, as 
a grievance, corroborate Bergstrand’s (2014) argument. Bauhr (2012:80) maintains, for instance, 
that “if corruption is not clearly felt in everyday life and its effects are divided and diffuse, it may 
motivate less engagement among broad sections of the population”.  
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Olken’s (2007) research in rural Indonesia illustrates how personalised grievances motivate 
citizens to challenge specific types of corruption. Olken (2007) found that Indonesian villagers 
were keener to prevent the officials (of the road construction projects) from fraudulently billing 
the labour they (i.e. villagers) had offered voluntarily and keeping the money for themselves. The 
villagers were less interested in preventing officials from stealing the building materials and 
selling them off in the black market, even though this was a more harmful form of corruption 
for the project (and thus for the interests of the entire community). The strong incentive to 
prevent illegal wage expenditures was grounded in the fact that this type of corruption was felt at 
the individual-level (i.e. the loss was more personal). Finding out that one has been personally 
cheated can produce grievances that are more intense than discovering that the community was 
ripped off. 
 
2.1. The exper ience  o f  br ibery as a mobi l i s ing gr ievance  
 
People who have not endured the hardship of living with endemic bribery may think that official demands 
for bribery are nothing more than background noise, easily and quickly paid and forgotten. In truth, every 
bribe demand represents an assertion of power over those without power or adequate redress, which over 
time engenders deep frustration, resentment, and anger (Nichols & Robertson 2017:7). 
 
Based on the analysis of the Global Corruption Barometer (GCB), Bauhr (2016) provides an 
explanation that is consistent with the above observation. Bauhr divides bribe payers into two 
groups: need bribers and greed bribers. Her analysis shows that individuals who pay bribes to 
gain illicit advantages (i.e. greed bribers) are less willing to undertake civic action targeting 
corruption. On the contrary, those who are ‘forced’ to pay above and beyond the officially 
sanctioned fees are more willing to support anti-corruption mobilisation. Bauhr’s (2016) 
explanation is that demand for bribes (i.e. extortions) provokes a strong sense of indignation and 
consequently, the willingness to be personally involved in anti-corruption efforts. Much of the 
social movement literature indeed suggests that emotions of resentment and anger prompt 
individuals to discount the personal costs of taking part in collective dissent (see Van 
Stekelenburg & Klandermans 2013). According to Jasper (1998) such ‘reactive emotions’ provide 
a powerful motivation for individuals to support a variety of collective resistance efforts. Paying 
more attention to the emotional side of the grievance explanation has enabled social movement 
scholars to explain why collective action arises in highly repressive settings or among individuals 
who may not feel equipped to make a difference (i.e. individuals with a low sense of both 
internal and external efficacy) (Goodwin, Jasper & Polletta 2001).  
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While Bauhr’s analysis is insightful, it overlooks the impact of the financial burden that having to 
pay a bribe imposes on individuals and households. The analysis does not reveal whether socio-
economic status of a need briber moderates her willingness to act against corruption in a 
significant way. To the extent that reactive emotions intensify with the amount of personal losses 
as Bergstrand (2014) has argued, it is possible that poor people who pay bribes on a regular basis 
are more willing to challenge corruption than their well-to-do compatriots who also pay bribes 
regularly.  
 
The analysis by Gingerich (2009) suggests that the accumulated burden of bribe payments 
intensifies citizens’ propensity to undertake aggressive anti-government protests in Bolivia. In 
this regard, he finds a non-linear relationship between the experience of bribery and propensity 
to participate in these activities. As he notes, the initial experiences of bribery do not produce 
noticeable changes in the likelihood to engage in anti-government protests “until the exposure 
level crosses some threshold point, after which further increases in exposure produce very large 
increases in the propensity to engage in anti-government protest” (Gingerich 2009:27). In other 
words, the positive impact of the experience of bribery has a tipping point. There is a threshold 
beyond which further extortions lead to a significant impetus to challenge the state through 
aggressive collective action.  It is important to note that the survey items Gingerich (2009) used 
did not ask how much respondents paid in bribes, instead they provided information on the 
number of public institutions where a bribe was demanded and paid. This justifies his argument 
that it is not just the paying of bribes that pushes people to challenge the state; it is the 
accumulated burden of corruption that is key.  
 
3. Materials and Methods 
3.1. Dependent variables  
This study’s dependent variable is measured using items drawn from rounds three and six of 
Afrobarometer surveys. To be sure, these items do not tell us what citizens have actually done to 
address corruption. Rather, they elicit opinions about the action they would take (or prefer 
people like them to take) against corruption. Thus, the items can be construed as measuring 
attitudinal support for collective action against corruption. In round three, Afrobarometer posed 
the following question:  
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What, if anything, would you do to try to resolve each of the following situations: ‘you suspected 
a school or clinic official of stealing’. Answers were coded as follows:  
• do nothing 
• don’t worry, things will be resolved given enough time  
• lodge a complaint through proper channels or procedures  
• use connections with influential people  
• offer a tip or bribe and  
• join in public protest. 
 
Each respondent chose only one option. Few people would contest the view that the act of 
stealing from local schools and clinics by officials constitutes ‘corruption’, to the extent that it 
violates the relationship of trust between citizens as a collective principal and officers as their 
agents. Asking people about a vague phenomenon like corruption can be fraught with 
measurement errors as respondents are likely to invoke a wide range of practices to answer the 
question. These are, hopefully, mitigated when respondents are made to adopt a similar frame of 
reference that this item provides by speaking of theft by officials instead of the value-laden 
concept of ‘corruption’. The response option ‘join protests’ will be the focus of data analysis and 
discussions in the next section. 
 
To reduce the number of response categories, we collapsed options four (use connections with 
influential people) and five (offer a tip or bribe) into a single category. Nevertheless, does it make 
sense to ‘offer a tip or bribe’ or ‘use connections with influential people’ as a way to tackle 
corruption? Alam (1995) contends that that a form of corruption such as bribery is one way in 
which victims of corruption can deal with venal officials. Alam calls this an ‘illicit countervailing 
action against corruption’. To illustrate how it works, he provides an example involving a 
powerful factory that pays bribes so that government officials so that they ignore the toxic 
chemicals it dumps into the river, thereby hurting the fisheries. Illicit countervailing action arises 
when the fishermen respond with bribes of their own to ‘influence’ the government to enforce 
the law regarding appropriate disposal of this toxic waste (Alam 1995). Alam’s illicit 
countervailing action echoes the sentiments by James Scott who noted that, “those who feel that 
their essential interests are ignored or considered illegitimate in the formal political system will 
gravitate to the informal channel of influence represented by corruption” (Scott 1969: 328).  
 
When asked how they would react to suspected acts of corruption in schools and clinics, more 
than two-thirds (68%) of the 25,391 respondents said they would report these to relevant 
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authorities (hereafter, the reporters). About 18% felt that nothing could be done about such issues 
(the acquiescents); 7% said they would use their connections with influential people or offer tips 
and bribes (the bribers); 4% said they would not worry about the problem as it would eventually 
get resolved given enough time (the carefrees). A small minority (2%) said they would resort to 
collective action in the form of protests (the protesters).  
 
The sixth round of Afrobarometer surveys asked respondents what they thought was the most 
effective thing that ‘ordinary people like you can do to help combat corruption’. This item has 
two important features. First, the use of the phrase “ordinary person like you” positions respondents 
at the centre of the fight against corruption. Second, in contrast with the item used in round 
three, this item specifically speaks about corruption more broadly. Again, respondents were 
restricted to choosing or mentioning only one option. Most of the respondents mentioned 
reporting the corrupt practices (29%) or refusing to pay bribes (25%). One in four respondents 
felt that there was nothing civilians could do to challenge corruption. Voting for clean candidates 
was mentioned by seven per cent of the respondents while speaking out (e.g. by calling a radio 
programme or writing a letter to the newspaper) was approved by 5 per cent of the respondents. 
Another 5 per cent felt that joining or supporting organisations that are fighting corruption 
could be the most effective thing to do. The least popular strategies were joining public protests 
(2%) and signing a petition calling for tougher sanctions against corruption (1.52%). Figure 1 
illustrates these frequency distributions. 
 
Figure 1: What is the most effective thing that an ordinary person like you can do to the help combat corruption in 
this country? 
 
 
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 
Sign a petition 
Participate in protest marches 
Talk to friends and relatives about the 
Speak out about the problem 
Join or support an organization that fights corruption 
Vote for clean candidates or parties 
Nothing / Ordinary people cannot do any 
Refuse to pay bribes 
Report corruption when you see or exper 
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Since estimating and interpreting the results of a multinomial logistic regression model with a 
nine-category outcome is cumbersome (and likely to consume too many degrees of freedom), we 
merged the options ‘speak about the problem’ with ‘talk to friends’ and labelled the resulting 
response category as ‘raise awareness’. We also merged ‘sign petitions’ with ‘support 
anticorruption organisations’ into one response category. This resulted into a seven-category 
variable in which about 6 per cent of the respondents preferred to sign a petition or support anti-
corruption organisations, while 8 per cent preferred to raise awareness about corruption. The 
frequency values of the other response options remained the same. 
 
As some scholars have argued, there could be a disjuncture between reported willingness to 
engage in civic action and taking part in it (van Zomeren et. al. 2012). This necessitates the 
comparison of the results regarding support for protests with the results on actual participation 
in protests and demonstrations. Indeed, according to Finkel & Muller (1998), utilising data on 
willingness or intentions to take part in protests with data on past protest behaviour can shed 
more light on the findings. Although the Afrobarometer did not ask about the main subject of 
the protest events that respondents attended, analysing the impact of corruption on the 
likelihood to have attended offers a layer of robustness for the results of the main analysis. The 
survey item used for this purpose reads as follows: ‘Here is a list of actions that people 
sometimes take as citizens. For each of these, please tell me whether you, personally, have done 
any of these things during the past year: Attended a street demonstration or protest march?’  
 
3.2. Independent and contro l  variables   
 
The main independent variable, the experience of bribery, is measured based on an additive 
index of five similarly worded questions about respondents’ payment of bribes. The questions 
read as follows: ‘In the past year, how often (if ever) have you had to pay a bribe, give a gift, or 
do a favour to government officials in order to: A) Get a document or permit? B) Get a child 
admitted in school? C) Get medicine or medical attention? D) Get a household service (like 
piped water, electricity, or phone)? E) Avoid problems with the police (like passing a checkpoint 
or avoiding a fine or arrest)?’ The response options were: ‘No experience with this in the past 
year,’ ‘Once or twice,’ ‘A few times,’ and ‘Often’. 
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Apart from the experience of bribery, there are several other variables that potentially influence 
the propensity to take part in protests. These can be grouped into grievances, resources and 
values.  To account for the effect of socioeconomic grievances, the estimated model includes 
three variables that we believe cover much of the spectrum of the economic deprivation concept: 
experiential poverty, personal living conditions and relative living conditions. Experiential 
poverty is measured based on Afrobarometer’s lived poverty index (LPI). The personal living 
conditions is measured based on the item asking respondents to assess their present economic 
conditions. Lastly, we consider respondents’ evaluation of their personal living conditions 
compared to other citizens as a measure of relative living conditions. 
 
We use the following variables as proxies for political grievances: the index of corruption 
perceptions and the index of political trust. The index of corruption perceptions is measured 
based on respondents’ assessment of how many of the officials in several public institutions (e.g. 
Parliament, public service, judiciary etc.) were corrupt. The response options on a four-point 
Likert scale ranged from ‘none of them are involved in corruption’ to ‘all of them are involved’. 
Political or institutional trust is measured based on items asking how much trust a respondent 
has in the president/prime minister, parliament, the police, the army and the courts of law, 
among others. 
 
The individual-level resources likely to influence support for anti-corruption protests are formal 
education attainment, membership in voluntary associations, generalised trust, a sense of self-
efficacy (i.e. internal efficacy) and interest in politics. Lastly, our model adjusts for the effect of 
tolerance for corruption. This variable is measured based on the additive index from three 
questions about the extent to which citizens think incidents such as political patronage, nepotism 
and bribery are ‘not wrong at all’, ‘wrong but understandable’ or ‘wrong and punishable’. In 
addition to these variables, we control for the usual demographic variables of age, gender and 
urban-rural status. Table A1 (in appendix) provides the exact wording of the items used to 
measure these variables and the Cronbach alpha values of the composite measures. 
 
3.3. Estimation s trateg ies   
Since the main response variable is a discrete choice set (i.e. unordered categorical variable), the 
analysis employs a multinomial logistic regression model and reports the relative probability of 
preferring a particular action against corruption. Since the objective of this paper is to assess how 
willingness to take part in anti-corruption protests changes in line with experiences of 
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corruption, it would be more meaningful to contrast the preference for other actions with the 
preference for protests. However, given that two thirds of the Afrobarometer respondents 
would rather report suspected acts of corruption, using reporters as a reference category is more 
efficient from the statistical perspective1. This notwithstanding, we re-estimated the MNL model 
using different reference categories to ascertain whether results are sensitive to changes in the 
base outcome 
4. Results 
Before turning to the main thrust of this paper — impact of bribery experience on propensity to 
engage in protests — it is important to briefly summarise the effects of some of the control 
variables. The demographic variables of age and gender have a statistically significant overall 
effect on preferred action against corruption. However, only the effects of age are significant for 
the contrast between protesters and reporters. The urban-rural status has no effect on the model 
(X2= 2.29, df =4, p= 0.6831) and has been excluded from the results shown in Table 1. Formal 
education attainment has a strong overall effect on preferred action against corruption. Further 
to that, an increase in education increases the odds of preferring to report relative to any other 
option. However, the effect is not significant for the protest-reporting contrast. 
  
																																																																				1	Indeed, the rule of thumb in multinomial logistic regression is that the reference category should be the 
response category with the highest frequency.	
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Table 1: Multinomial logistic regression predicting preferred action against corruption  
 
Acquiescents Carefrees Bribers Protesters 
Experience of bribery 
0. 130 
(0.07) 
0.010  
(0.11) 
0.385*** 
(0.07) 
0.454*** 
(0.12) 
Corruption perceptions 
-0.137*** 
(0.04) 
0.149*   
(0.07) 
0.052 
(0.05) 
-0.042 
(0.09) 
Organizational membership 
-0.019 
(0.02) 
-0.123*** 
(0.03) 
0.01 
(0.02) 
0.057 
(0.03) 
Lived poverty 
-0.045 
(0.03) 
0.094 
(0.05) 
-0.043 
(0.04) 
0.009 
(0.07) 
Tolerance for corruption 
-0.291*** 
(0.05) 
-0.724*** 
(0.09) 
-0.449*** 
(0.07) 
-0.215 
(0.12) 
Personal living conditions 
0.012 
(0.03) 
0.082 
(0.05) 
0.05 
(0.04) 
-0.052 
(0.06) 
Relative living conditions 
0.028 
(0.03) 
-0.062 
(0.05) 
-0.003 
0.04 
0.181** 
0.07 
Institutional trust 
-0.225*** 
(0.04) 
-0.228*** 
(0.06) 
-0.165*** 
(0.04) 
-0.203** 
(0.08) 
Education attainment 
-0.135*** 
(0.02) 
-0.111*** 
(0.03) 
-0.087*** 
(0.02) 
-0.011 
(0.03) 
Age 
-0.002 
(0.00) 
0.006 
(0.00) 
0.001 
(0.00) 
-0.008 
(0.00) 
Female 
0.259*** 
(0.05) 
0.167 
(0.09) 
-0.052 
(0.07) 
0.086 
(0.12) 
Generalised trust 
-0.03 
(0.07) 
0.401*** 
(0.1) 
0.324*** 
(0.08) 
0.374** 
(0.14) 
Political interest 
-0.129*** 
(0.02) 
-0.035 
(0.04) 
0.02 
(0.03) 
0.205*** 
(0.06) 
Internal political efficacy 
 
0.044* 
(0.02) 
-0.01 
(0.02) 
0.07 
(0.03) 
0.108* 
(0.05) 
Intercept  
-0.874 
 (0.137) 
-2.054  
(0.207) 
-1.640 
(0.175) 
-2.419 
(0.248) 
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Notes: 
Reference category is ‘report corruption’ 
*= significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%; *** significant at 0.1% 
Note: country fixed effects included in regression but omitted from the table 
 
Although tolerance for corruption has a strong overall effect on reactions to allegations of 
corruption (X2= 111.02, df. =4, p<0.001), it has no significant effect on the preference for 
protest relative to reporting. Instead, admitting that corruption is acceptable or understandable 
has a strong positive effect on the relative probability of preferring to use a bribe or influential 
connections to address problems. Furthermore, as shown in Table 1, those who are most 
tolerant of corruption are also significantly more likely to say that nothing can be done about 
suspected acts of corruption or that they wouldn’t worry as corruption can be solved without 
their involvement (i.e. carefree). It seems therefore that those who are most tolerant of 
corruption are unlikely to take part in anti-corruption initiatives. Instead, they are significantly 
more likely to draw upon clientelistic networks or simply offer bribes to address public goods 
problems. These results suggest two lessons. First, they are consistent with the idea that personal 
discontent with corruption underlies the willingness to engage in anti-corruption protests; those 
who are tolerant of corruption are unlikely to be aggrieved by it. Second, they show that 
tolerance for corruption may help explain the propensity to reject official channels of addressing 
state-related grievances (exit). 
 
A unit increase in perceptions of corruption initially increases the preference for using bribery 
and influential connections rather than reporting corruption. But this effect disappears when 
more control variables are added. As shown in Table 1, a unit increase in trust increases the 
likelihood of preferring to report corruption rather than join protests or use influential people 
(i.e. clientelistic networks). The negative overall effect of institutional trust on relative willingness 
to join protests supports the well-established idea in the literature that those who have no 
confidence in state institutions and the rule of law tend to gravitate towards non-institutionalised 
methods of political participation. 
 
Turning to the main results, the experience of bribery is likely to have a very strong effect on 
citizens’ reactions to corruption. Holding other variables at their mean values, a positive change 
from having an average experience with bribery increases the relative probability of preferring to 
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join protests by 0.011 (p< 0.01); the same change increases the relative probability of preferring 
to draw on influential connections by more than twice that amount (0.026, p<0.001). The fact 
that the average marginal effect of the experience of bribery on the preference for the use of 
bribes and influential connections is higher than that of the preference for protest should not 
come as a surprise. Indeed, as intimated in previous sections, there are grounds to expect the 
regular paying of bribes to reinforce the perception that individual solutions actually work. The 
implication of this finding is that regular bribers are more likely to choose to pay a bribe or 
approach influential people (e.g. local political leaders, business-people, traditional authorities, 
religious leaders, etc.) when they face problems in their communities and personal lives. 
 
To capture the differential effects of the increase in the frequency of bribery, we plot predicted 
probabilities of each of the five reactions to allegations of corruption at specific values of the 
bribery index (see Figure 2). When no bribe has been paid in the past year (i.e. point zero on the 
graph), the probability of being willing to join protests is almost zero. In sharp contrast, the 
probability of preferring to report or acquiesce is highest for an individual with no bribery 
experience. The predicted probability of reporting or acquiescing declines steadily as the 
experience of bribery accumulates. It would seem therefore that the majority of those who prefer 
to report or say that nothing can be done did not have much, if any, direct experience with 
bribery, and that having this experience would increase their likelihood of choosing to either join 
protests or pay bribes as a response to corruption allegations.  
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Figure 2: Probability of different actions against corruption at different values of the frequency of bribe payment  
 
 
Indeed, a respondent who has the highest experience of paying bribes is predicted to have a 40 
per cent probability of preferring anti-corruption protests. On the other hand, the same 
individual has less than 5 per cent chance of preferring to report or say that nothing can be done 
about corruption. Although these results are instructive, a caveat is in order; the predicted 
estimates for the protest category are less reliable at higher values of bribery payment due to 
insufficient data. Overall, the analysis indicates that bribery increases the individual preference 
for using protests and influential connections (and bribery) to address corruption allegations 
while, at the same time, reducing the preference for other ways of addressing corruption. It is 
important to note that the relative probability of preferring to use every other action besides 
protesting declines at some point in the progression of bribery experience. The diminishing 
probabilities of preferring other forms of action against corruption indicate that protest is likely 
to be the most preferred reaction against corruption allegations for citizens with very high experience 
of corruption.  
 
In summary, the results show that individuals with an increasing experience of bribery are less 
likely to report corruption allegations or say that nothing can be done about it. When such 
individuals suspect that corruption is taking place, they are more likely to initiate a protest or use 
their access to powerful people in the community to address the problem. In general, therefore, 
bribers are significantly more likely to resort to extra-institutional methods to address public 
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goods’ problems. Importantly, the effect of bribery experience as a grievance seems to be 
independent of other socio-economic and political grievances, personal values and resource 
mobilisation variables. That is, the experience of bribery increases the potential for anti-
corruption collective action in spite of the impact of other predictors of civic engagement.  
 
4.1. Evidence f rom round s ix survey 
Regressing this seven-category variable against the variables2 used in the models estimated in the 
previous section yields results that are broadly consistent with the main narrative in that section. 
Holding other variables at their mean values, the relative probability of supporting anti-
corruption protests rises with the increasing frequency of paying a bribe. Furthermore, an 
increase in frequency of paying a bribe increases support for raising awareness or voting for 
clean political parties relative to reporting corruption. On the other hand, an increase in the 
experience of bribery decreases the relative probability of thinking that reporting corruption or 
refusing to pay bribes is the most effective thing citizens can do about corruption. Similarly, the 
likelihood of saying that there is nothing ordinary people can do declines as the experience of 
bribery accumulates. To get a more nuanced picture of the effect of the experience of bribery, 
we plot changes in the probability to prefer each of the seven anti-corruption tactics at different 
values of the experience of bribery variable. The two panels shown in Figure 3 present the 
results of this procedure. 
																																																																				
2 Round six does not have questions about corruption tolerance and generalised trust 
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Figure 3: Predicted probability of different actions against corruption at different points in the frequency of bribe 
payments (Round 6 data) 
 
 
The results shown in panel 2 suggest that generally, the probability of selecting response 
categories ‘raise awareness’, ‘vote for clean candidates and ‘join protests’ rises as the experience 
of bribery increases. For the ‘sign petitions or support anti-corruption organisations’ option, the 
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relationship changes its positive trajectory to negative as bribery experiences accumulate. Apart 
from this strong non-linearity, those who do not have any direct experience with corruption have 
a higher probability of preferring this option compared to the other forms of civic engagement 
against corruption. These results indicate quite strongly that individuals with vast experience of 
paying bribes are less likely to see offering support for anti-corruption organisations or signing a 
petition as viable strategies against endemic graft.    
   
Apart from acting as a robustness check, analysing round six data reveals more interesting 
nuances about the nature of the impact of direct exposure to corruption. The declining 
probability of refusing to pay a bribe as personal experience of bribery increases is highly 
consistent with the rising probability of using bribes and influential connections as the 
experience of bribery accumulates as reported in the previous section. The story that emerges 
from the analysis of these two data sets is that an individual with the highest personal experience 
of bribery is less likely to stop paying bribes. However, the same individual could also be much 
more willing to join protests staged in the name of anti-corruption.  
 
4.2. Bribery and part i c ipat ion in actual  protes ts  
 
We estimate a fixed effects complimentary log-log regression model to ascertain the effect of the 
experience of bribery on propensity to take part in actual protests and demonstrations.  
Consistent with the results of the previous section, the perception of corruption has a non-
significant effect on the odds of having taken part in past protests and demonstrations.  The 
experience of bribery has a strong positive effect. Additionally, the quadratic term of the 
frequency of bribery is negative and statistically significant, indicating a concave relationship 
between bribery experience and the probability of taking part in protests (see Table 2).  
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Table 2: Complimentary log-log regression of protest participation 
  Robust 
Coef. 
  
Std. 
Err. 
  
z 
  
P>z 
 [95% Conf. Interval] 
 
      Experience of bribery 0.823 0.117 7.03 0.00 0.593 1.052 
Quadratic term of bribery -0.279 0.065 -4.31 0.00 -0.405 -0.152 
Corruption perceptions 0.027 0.037 0.73 0.46 -0.045 0.099 
Organizational 
membership 0.175 0.011 16.12 0.00 0.154 0.197 
Lived poverty 0.060 0.026 2.29 0.02 0.009 0.112 
Tolerance for corruption -0.062 0.051 -1.23 0.22 -0.162 0.037 
Persons living conditions 0.006 0.022 0.27 0.79 -0.038 0.05 
Relative living conditions -0.037 0.025 -1.5 0.14 -0.085 0.011 
Institutional trust -0.011 0.031 -0.36 0.72 -0.072 0.049 
Education attainment 0.047 0.013 3.57 0.00 0.021 0.072 
Age -0.004 0.002 -2.07 0.04 -0.008 0.00 
Female -0.260 0.045 -5.74 0.00 -0.348 -0.171 
Generalised trust 0.020 0.059 0.16 0.87 -0.106 0.126 
Political interest 0.250 0.026 9.58 0.00 0.199 0.302 
Internal political efficacy -0.021 0.018 -1.17 0.24 -0.057 0.014 
Rural 0.071 0.048 1.48 0.14 -0.023 0.166 
Intercept -2.281 0.141 -16.14 0.00 -2.556 -2.00 
Notes: country fixed effects included in regression modelling but omitted from the table 
 
The results indicate that increasing experience of bribery has a strong positive effect on the 
probability of taking part in protests. This is consistent with the interpretation that the 
experience of paying bribes is, indeed, a mobilising grievance as established in previous sections. 
Nevertheless, the strong quadratic effect qualifies the results somewhat; it seems that a much 
more regular encounter with bribery dampens the propensity to take part in protests and 
demonstrations. This sharply contradicts the findings of the study that Gingerich (2009) 
conducted in Bolivia where the accumulated experience of paying bribes intensified citizens’ 
willingness to participate in protests. 
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It is worth pointing out that this strong effect of the bribery experience variable can also be 
detected when round six data are used. Importantly, the quadratic term of bribery is also 
significantly negative in the regression models based on round six data. (see Figure 4). This 
implies that the non-linear effect of bribery experience on propensity to join protests and 
demonstrations may not be an artefact of a specific data set. 
 
 
Figure 4: The differential impact of bribery experience on probability of protest participation in rounds three and 
six 
 
 
Although the multinomial regression model presented in the previous section and the logistic 
model of past participation in protests are not entirely comparable, it is remarkable that the 
effect of bribery comes out so significant in both. This is because collective action scholars often 
point to the discrepancies that arise when models that predict people’s intentions are compared 
with those on actual behaviour. In fact, studies conducted in Europe show that people who 
expressed support for protests do not always follow through with corresponding action.  
Klandermans and Stekelenburg (2014) for instance found that only two out of five Dutch 
citizens who supported protest action against the proliferation of nuclear weapons actually took 
part in the anti-nuclear protests. According to Zomeren et. al. (2008:510) the disjuncture 
between intentions and actual behaviour arises because “compared with intentions, behaviour is 
subject to interference from additional random or systematic factors”.  
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Discussion  
This paper examined the extent to which personal experiences of bribery influence the 
willingness of ordinary Africans to challenge corruption through protests and demonstrations. 
The findings demonstrate that on average, regular bribers prefer the use of protests to address 
corruption and that they do take part in actual protests and demonstrations. The generally 
positive effect of the experience of bribery survives various empirical conditions. It is detectable 
when the model is tested on a dataset that has more than three times the number of individuals. 
Further analysis of the data shows that an experience with bribery increases the probability of 
actually joining protests only up to a certain point, after which the effect of additional payments 
tapers off. This corresponds with the interpretation that individuals for whom corruption has 
become routine could be slightly less willing to participate in collective dissent. The results of the 
protest participation model should be cautiously interpreted since we do not know whether the 
protests that a respondent attended were about corruption or governance issues more broadly.   
 
Seen from the grievance perspective, the highly consistent mobilising effect of the experience of 
bribery seems to stand in sharp contrast to Uslaner’s (2008) assertion that petty corruption is not 
a source of discontent for ordinary people. As he notes, “the sort of corruption that engulfs 
ordinary citizens – petty corruption — is not as morally troubling as the grand thievery of the 
rich and powerful” (Uslaner 2008:244). “It is the high-level corruption— among government 
officials and business people— that makes ordinary people disaffected” and willing to challenge 
it (Uslaner 2008:123).  
 
One important yet unexpected finding is that regular bribers are unlikely to see refusal to pay 
bribes as a solution to the problem of corruption and are much more likely to use bribes and 
influential connections to solve public administration problems. This finding casts some light on 
the idea that residents of highly corrupt societies, especially those who are regularly being 
involved in corruption, appreciate the ‘problem-solving’ function of bribery (see Persson, 
Rothstein & Teorell 2013, Heywood 2017). These individuals know that refusing to pay often 
means going without the public good or service that petty corruption or connections with 
influential individuals secures for them (see Hope 2017). What is more, as Persson, Teorell & 
Rothstein (2013:463) observe, “the amounts paid to venal officials are often surprisingly small 
compared to the sorts of relative, short-term gains realised by those who pay the bribes”.  
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What previous studies have not revealed and, indeed what acts as a basis for optimism is the fact 
that regular bribers are also likely to see citizen-centred interventions as effective means of 
tackling corruption. Moreover, if presented with the choice between refusing to pay a bribe and 
taking part in anti-corruption protests and demonstrations, bribers are significantly more likely to 
prefer the latter. Taken together, these results imply that seeing corruption as a problem-solving 
device should not be interpreted as a sign of ‘resignation’ or cynicism. It does not imply that 
victims of corruption will shy away from using other means available to them to express their 
discontent. While most ordinary Africans with an experience of paying bribes are unlikely to 
resist demands for bribes or report incidences of corruption, they are much more likely to 
support citizens’ efforts to bring corruption under control. This study is the first to articulate this 
finding.   
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Appendix 
Table A1: Predictor variables used in the study 
Variable  Exact wording Variable construction 
   
Experience of 
bribery index 
In the past year, how often (if ever) have 
you had to pay a bribe, give a gift, or do a 
favour to government officials to: A) Get a 
Document or a permit? B) Get a child into 
school? C) Get a household service (like 
piped water, electricity or phone)? D) Get 
medicine or medical attention? E) Avoid a 
problem with the police (like passing a 
checkpoint or avoiding a fine or arrest)? 
0 = Never, 1 = Once or twice, 2 = A few 
times, 3 = Often 
 
Maximum likelihood factor 
analysis with oblique rotation 
extracted one solution with a 
Cronbach’s alpha value of 
0.78. 
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Corruption 
perception index 
How many of the following people do you 
think are involved in corruption, or haven’t 
you heard enough about them to say? A) 
The president and officials in his office? B) 
Members of Parliament? C) Elected local 
government councillors? D) National 
Government Officials? E) Local 
government officials? F) Police? G) Tax 
officials? H) Judges and magistrates? 
 0 = None of them, 1 = Some of them, 2 = 
Most of them, 3= All of them 
Maximum likelihood factor 
analysis with oblique rotation 
extracted one solution with a 
Cronbach’s alpha value of 
0.91. 
Lived Poverty 
Index (LPI) 
Over the past year, how often, if ever, have 
you or your family gone without: A) Enough 
food to eat? B) Enough clean water for 
home use? C) Medicines or medical 
treatment? D) Enough fuel to cook your 
food? E) A cash income? 
Never= 0,Just once or twice=1, Several 
times=2, many times=3, Always=4 
Maximum likelihood factor 
analysis with oblique rotation 
extracted one solution with a 
Cronbach’s alpha value of 
0.77. 
 
Relative living  
conditions 
In general, how do you rate your living 
conditions compared with those of other 
countrymen? 
 
Education What is the highest level of education you 
have completed? 
 
Organisational 
membership 
Please tell me whether you are an official 
leader, an active member, an inactive 
member, or not a member? Member of 
voluntary association or community group. 
 
Corruption 
tolerance index 
For each of the following, please indicate 
whether you think the act is not wrong at all, 
wrong but understandable, or wrong and 
punishable. A) A government official gives a 
Composite index 
Scale Reliability =0.6512 
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job to someone from his family who does 
not have adequate qualifications B) A 
government official demands a favour or an 
additional payment for some service that is 
part of his job? C) A public official decides 
to locate a development project in an area 
where his friends and supporters lived 
1=Not wrong at all, 2=Wrong but 
understandable, 3=wrong and punishable 
Organisational 
membership 
Now I am going to read out a list of groups 
that people join or attend. For each one, 
could you tell me whether you are an official 
leader, an active member, an inactive 
member, or not a member? 
A) A religious group (e.g., church, mosque)? 
B) A trade union or farmers association? C) 
A professional or business association? D) A 
community development or self-help 
association 
Composite index  
Scale Reliability = 0.5602 
Generalised trust Generally speaking, would you say that most 
people can be trusted or that you must be 
very careful in dealing with people? 
1= Most people can be trusted. 0= You 
must be very careful 
 
Institutional trust 
index 
How much do you trust each of the 
following, or haven’t you heard enough 
about them to say? The president; 
Parliament; The National electoral 
commission; Tax department; The army; 
The police; Elected local government 
officials; Courts of law. 
0 = Not at all, 1 = Just a little, 2 = 
Somewhat, 3 = A lot 
Maximum likelihood factor 
analysis with oblique rotation 
extracted one solution with a 
scale reliability of = 0.89 
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Political interest How interested would you say you are in 
public affairs? 
 
 
News media use  How often do you get news from the Radio? 
 
 
Internal efficacy Do you agree or disagree with the following 
statements? 
  Politics and government sometimes seem 
so complicated that you can’t really 
understand what’s going on. 
1= Strongly Agree  
2= Agree  
3= Neither Agree Nor Disagree  
4=Disagree Strongly  
5= Disagree  
9= Don’t know [DNR]  
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